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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT \V. HANKS, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
JOHN \V. TCI_l~ER, "T arden, ) 




BRIEF OF RESPOIWENT 
STA'l'E)IENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The appellant Robert "~. Hanks appeals from 
the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
hy the Honorable Stewart ~I. Hanson, Judge of the 
Distnct Court of the Third Judicial District. 
DISPOSITION IN LO\YER COURT 
. On N oYember 24, 1965, the appellant filed a peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court 
1 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, allell'in th 
1 f .1 e· g at h1> p ea o gm ty was coerced and that he was bei ' 
· d · h U h S P · · ng de. tame m t e ta tate rison m violation of h' 
. . 1 . h I IS COii· 
shtutiona rig ts. nterrogatories were served l 
. . . on lit 
petitioner and an answer to lus petition was du!v fil d 
denying the contention made by the appellant that\; 
was being held in violation of the Constitution of !ht 
United States and the Constitution of Utah. On De. 
cember 15, 1965, a pretrial was held in which the court 
restricted the issues for the time of trial as to whether 
the petitioner's plea was coerced and whether the peti-
tioner had been advised as to the consequences of hi) 
plea of guilty. Answers to the interrogatories were 
filed and hearing was held on January 7, 1966. On 
January 20, 1966, the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, 
Judge, entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment denying the appellant the relief 
sought by habeas corpus. 
RELIEI<-. SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the decision of the district 
court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
· h f II · a statement oi Respondent submits t e o owmo . , 
. . 1. t' for a writ ol facts. The petitioner m his app ica ion . 
. . h h' I a of gmltY was habeas corpus md1cated t at ·is P e . · b. 




R ·J \. In his answer to interrogatories, the peti-
tion . · '"'· 
1
·11dicated that at the time of his preliminary t1oner 
br;ffing at Provo, h~ received a .copy of ~he .complaint 
i · I ,.·as read to him, ·was advised of his right to an 
\\'Jl!C l " 
·ittornei·, and waived preliminary hearing (R. 16). At 
'. 11 ~ tim~ of the hearing before the district court on the 
appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, no 
mdence was offered to indicate that the appellant was 
not proper}~· afforded a preliminary he3:ring. The appel-
lant onh· indicated that he could not recall a prelimi-
nary hearing. 
The appellant testified (R. 41) that he was ar-
rested in Price, Utah, on the charge for which he is 
presently being confined. He stated that subsequent 
to his arrest, he was confronted by several police officers 
he could not identify, who were screaming and yelling 
at him and told him that if he would plead guilty, he 
would get probation but if he did not, he would be sent 
to prison (R. 42). The same day, the petitioner was 
taken to Provo by two Provo police officers (R. 43). 
The appellant was unable to identify the officers but 
testified that they told him that if he plead guilty, he 
would get out in a month, but that if he did not, he 
'"ould be in jail a long time. The appellant testified 
that he advised the district court at the time of his 
arraignment that he did not want a lawyer because he 
thought he would get probation (R. 44). He acknowl-
edged that at the time of arraignment, the court advised 
him that if he entered a plea of guilty, it could be very 
serious (R. 45). The appellant further testified that 
3 
it was several weeks after his arrest in Price and t _ 
. p b f' h ran~ portahon to rovo e ore e appeared for his 
liminary hearing in Provo ( R. 50) . He indicated ~~~ 1 
his only conversations with the police officers occurr;rl 
on the day of his arrest and while he was being t k a ·en 
to Provo ( R. 51) . He could not identify the officer.i 
and it was from two to three weeks thereafter that br 
appeared in court for arraignment (R. 51). Tlit 
appellant had only a sixth-grade education (R. 53
1 
but had been in trouble for misdemeanors and juvenile 
offenses before and had been in the State Industrial 
School (R. 52). Exhibit P-1 is a transcript of the 
arraingnment of the petitioner in the district court. 
The appellant was eighteen years of age at the time 
of his arraignment (Exhibit P-1, page 2). At that 
time the following occurred: 
"THE COURT: Do you have an attorney 
[to] represent you? 
MR. TAN AS JOSEPH NE'\VMAN,JR.: 
No, sir. 
MR. ROBERT HANKS: No, sir. 
THE COURT: You have legal rights and 
may have an attorney of you w-ish? 
MR. TAN AS JOSEPH NEWMAN, JR.: 
No, sir. 
MR. ROBERT ,V. HANKS: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Do you want to proceed 
without one? 
MR. TAN AS JOSEPH NE,VMAN,JR.: 
Yes, sir. 
4 
MR. ROBERT ,V. HANKS: Yes, sir. 
THE COVR'f: You are charged here with 
'l felonv ·which is a serions offense that could re-
:ult lJ.11. punishment of being sent to the State 
Prison Ji yon axmt an attorney you may have 
und 
.JlR. TAN AS JOSEPH NE,VMAN, JR.: 
No, sir. 
MR. ROBERT ,V. HANKS: No, sir. 
THE COFRT: You are ready for arraign-
ment at this time? 
.JIR. TANAS JOSEPH NE"\Vl\i1AN, JR.: 
Yes, sir. 
:\IR. ROBERT ,V. HANKS: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: The clerk will read the In-
formation. 
(''Thereupon the Information was read to both 
defendants by Evans Smith, Deputy Clerk.) 
THE COURT: The record may show that 
each of the defendants have been handed a copy 
of the Information. 
Let me advise both of you again you have legal 
rights and may have a attorney to represent you 
if you desire, or you may take time to consider 
this, or you may enter a plea at this time by 
answering guilty or not guilty to this charge in 
the Information. 
'Vhat do you want to do, Mr. Newman? 
MR. TAN.AS JOSEPH NE,VMAN, JR.: 
I plead guilty. 
THE COURT: You plead guilty. And Mr. 
Hanks? 
5 
MR. ROBERT ,V. HANKS· I I 
guilty." · P ead 
The appellant was, therefore, advised thre t' e 1mes 
that if he wanted an attorney, he could have on I e. n 
each instance, he advised the court he would proceed 
without the assistance of an attorney. At one point, the 
court asked the district attorney as follows: 
"THE COURT: This is not one of those 
cases where it's depriving an owner of a motor 
vehicle, I hope?" 
The district attorney replied: 
"MR. SORENSEN: No, your Honor. There 
is a difference of opinion as to what that statute 
means. The Utah Court has said the slightest 
asportation is larceny. But this case is not ont 
that would come within the misdemeanor stat-
ute." 
During the appellant's arraignment, the court , 
stated: 
"THE COURT: 'Vould you like to have 
the matter ref erred to the Department so they 
can determine whether or not you can be placed 
on probation?" 
Thus, the appellant was aware of the need of a pre· 
trial investigation to consider the eligibility of his pro· 
bation. The district attorney stated at the end of the 
arraignment: 
"MR. SORENSEN: ''re are not about to 
recommend anything on the part of the State 
until we have an investigation ~nd ~eport m~~; 
by the Department. But Louisiana is a mem 
6 
ot the compad. It depends on how you check 
out." 
1 ,ponse tbe court stated: n re~ ' 
"THE COURT: It will be August the 6th. 
Tirne for pronouncing judgment in this matter 
vill be ~et for August 6, 1965, at 9 :00 a.m. The 
"'~~e is referred to the Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole for an investigation and 
report and recommendation." 
On July 30, 1965, the matter came before Judge 
Harding for pronouncement of judgment. The record 
reflects (P-2, page 2): 
"MR. SORENSEN: This matter is before 
your Honor for pronouncement of judgment. 
THE COURT: Do you have an attorney to 
represent you, .Mr. Hanks? 
MR. ROBERT YV. HANKS: No. 
THE COURT: Do you wish to have one? 
MR. ROBERT ,V. HANKS: No, sir. 
* * * 
THE COCRT: The probation report is not 
good. I hate to send you over to the State Prison . 
. ~ wonder if we could make some other dispo-
s1t10n of your case? "r ould you object to having 
a continuance for one week to see whether we 
can ~ake some other arrangements other than 
sendmg you to the State Prison? 
MR. ROBERT "r· HANKS: No, sir." 
The facts, therefore, disclose that the appellant 
was fully aware that probation was not guaranteed and 
7 
that he was being considered for probatio 
1 . n on y 011 his record. Further, the record discloses that the 
1 . . d h" . appe[. ant agam waive is right to counsel Sub · sequent]y 
on August 6, 1965, the court sentenced the a II·' . . ppe ant 
to the State Prison for the mdeterminate ter 
vided by law (Exhibit P-3) . 
m prr;. 
Based upon the above facts appearing at the time 
of the appellant's hearing on his application for a writ 
of habeas corpus, Judge Stewart M. Hanson entered 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that tht 
appellant's plea was voluntarily entered after full ad· 
vice as to his right to counsel and the possible conse-
quences and seriousness of his plea ( R. 25-26). The 
trial court further found that the appellant's conten 
tion that he was promised probation was not factuaUy 
meritorious (R. 26). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE OF RECORD CLEARLY 
SUPPORTS 'l' HE DETERMINATION OF 
THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE APPEL· 
LANT'S PLEA WAS NOT INDUCED BY 
PROMISES OR THREATS AND WAS WITH· 
OUT LEGAL MERIT. 
The appellant contends that the trial court erred 
in concluding that the appellant's plea of guilty.was 
not induced by promises or threats. It is submitted 
8 
I t 'al eourt's finding has adequate support in that t ie fl , . . 
. d and consequently there is no basis for re-
tile recor • . . 
I f the trial court's decision. rersa o 
'l'l onfr eYidence offered in support of the appel-1e • 
·, .011tention that his plea was induced by promises lanr s c . •. 
11
;. threats ,ms the appellant's testimony to the effect 
that ,0me police office1s in Price told him at the time 
oi his arrest that if he plead guilty, he ·would get pro-
liation, but that if he plead not guilty, he would go to 
pil. He further testified that on the same day, Provo 
City officers who took him to Provo advised him to sit 
tigl~t and that if he plead guilty, he would only get a 
month in jail, but that if he plead not guilty, it would 
he longer. On the other hand, the appellant was unable 
to proYide any identity as to the officers who had made 
these statements and was obscure as to the exact nature 
of their threats and inducements. His testimony con-
ceming the incident in Price is at best indefinite. The 
only testimony that is specific is that there were some 
officers in a room who yelled at him and that the alleged 
statement was made. At no time did the appellant 
testify that he was actually promised probation. Fur-
ther, the fact that he was unable to give any reasonable 
identification of the officers who allegedly made the 
statements lends substantial doubt as to the credence 
of his contention. In addition it was several weeks after 
the alleged incident that the appellant was brought 
before a committing magistrate and there advised of 
~Is rights. At the time of arraignment, he made no in-
lllcahon to the court that he expected probation or 
9 
that he had been threatened or in any way 
1
· d 
. n uced t1 
plead gmlty other than the fact that he w . J 
. as gu1ltv 
Prior to the actual en:ry of the appellant's plea, ti;; 
court expressly told him that he was charged with a 
felony which was a serious offense "that could l resu t 
by punishment of being sent to the State Pr' " Ison. 
OSSJ· 
Therefore, the appellant was well aware of the p 
bility of his being sent to prison before he actualli· 
entered his plea of guilty. In addition the appellai;t 
had previously been institutionalized at the State Jn. 
dustrial School, appeared at juvenile courts, and had 
been arrested on prior occasions. He was, therefore, noi 
unfamiliar with court procedure and was also well aware 
of his prior record which would reasonably lead a person 
to conclude that prison was a definite possibility. Fur· 
ther, the prior criminal involvement of the appellant 
itself tends to detract from the veracity of his testimony. 
It is well established that an individual seeking 
release from custody by petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus has the burden of proof to demonstrate to the 
court that he is entitled to release. Ex parte Riddle, 51 
Cal.2d 848, 22 Cal. Rep. 472, 372 P.2d 304 (1962); 
39 C. J. S., Habeas Corpus, § 100; 25 Am. Jur., 
Habeas Corpus § 150. Further, in this case the 
facts at the time of hearing were resolved against 
the appellant. In this situation the evidence will be 
viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court's 
determination since it had the opportunity of hearmg 
the evidence first hand and appraising the demeanor 
and conduct of the witnesses. It was incumbent on the 
10 
d t ·n the instant case to carry the burden of respon en 1 . . 
f t how that he was entitled to a writ of habeas proo o s 
It. ;., incumbent on the appellant at this stage corpus. ·- . , . 
to demonstrate that the trial courts resolut10n of the 
. t ·as wbollv unreasonable. Generally, the appel-tac s \\ " ,J 
!ant has the burden of demonstrating his right to relief 
bv clear and convincing evidence. Wilson v. Hand, 
!SI Kan. 483, 311 P.2d 1009 (1957); Montgomery 
r. Hand, 183 Kan. 118, 325 P.2d 69 ( 1958); Appli-
rntion of Gaskill, 335 P.2d 1088 (Okla. Crim. 1959). 
In addition the courts have generally recognized 
that unsupported or uncorroborated statements of a 
petitioner for habeas corpus will not in and of them-
selves support the burden of proof in the absence of 
some compelling reason to demonstrate the clear truth-
fulness of the petitioner's testimony. Hicks v. Hand, 
189 Kan. 415, 369 P .2d 250 ( 1962) ; Ex parte Langley, 
325 P.2d 1094 (Okla. Crim. 1958). In the instant case 
there was nothing to support the petitioner's conten-
tion that his plea was not voluntarily entered except 
his own uncorroborated and vague testimony. On the 
other hand the record of the arraignment proceedings 
and the time between the alleged threats and the time 
of plea tend to clearly indicate that the appellant's 
plea was voluntarily entered and to support the trial 




APPELLANT'S CONTENTION, THAT HE 
SHOULD HA VE BEEN GRANTED RELIE}' 
BY HABEAS CORPUS BECAUSE OF AN AL. 
LEGED FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COl;RT 
TO ADVISE HI.M AS TO THE CO:\TSE. 
QUENCES OF HIS PLEA OF GUILTY, IS 
WITHOUT FOUNDATION IN FACT OR 
LAW. 
The appellant contends in Point II of his brief that 
the trial court should have afforded him relief by habea~ 
corpus, and that he was not properly adYised as to the 
possible consequences of his plea of guilty. 
The record belies the contention that the appellanl 
was not advised of the consequences of his plea. The 
court expressly told the appellant that his plea of guilty 
to the offense was a very serious matter which coula 
result in his confinement in the State Prison. The courl 
stated: 
"You are charged here with a felony wl~icn 
is a serious offense that could result by pumsh· 
ment of being sent to the State Prison. If you 
want an attorney you may have one?" 
It is obvious that this advice clearly appraised the ap· 
pellant that if he plead guilty, he could be confi~ea 
in the State Prison. The appellant relies on Sect'.on 
77-24-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. That section 
provides: 
t d br "Where the defendant is not represen e · 
12 
counsel, the court shall not a
1 
c?epdt a plhea dof 
·1t, until it shall have exp ame to t e e-
gUI) f h 1" fendant the consequences o sue pea. 
The appellant also relies on the case of State v. Ban-
, d l3 U.2d 63, 368 P.2d 473 (1962). The facts 
for , 1 . d' h 
before the court in the instant case clear y m icate t at 
the above quoted section ·was complied with by the 
trial court before accepting the appellant's plea. The 
ease of State v. Ranford in no way supports the posi-
tion of the appellant. In that case the court iotated: 
"The record shows that while appellant was 
warned after his plea of guilty that he might not 
receive probation, nothing was told him by the 
court as to the consequences of a plea of guilty 
or that such a plea would subject him to a term 
in the state prison.'' 
In the instant case the appellant was very care-
fully appraised of the serious nature of his plea and 
expressly advised that a plea of guilty could subject 
him to confinement in the State Prison. Thus, the 
situation in the Ranford case was inapposite to that 
now before the court. Further, the record here reflects 
that the appellant was not unfamiliar with criminal 
proceedings. He had previously been before the juve-
nile court, confined in the State Industrial School and 
exposed to police arrest on other occasions. Conse-
quently, the appellant was not unfamiliar with the 
possibilities of going to prison. Further, the court 
ordered a presentence report and indicated that an 
mvestigation would have to be made before any deter-
13 
mination could be reached as to whether t}
1 1 e appe la·1t 
should be placed on probation. 1 
The respondent contends that failure to 
comph 
with the provisions of Section 77-24-6 l~tal C : 
' . I Uil\ 
Annotated, 1953, should not be the basis for I 
1 ladta1 
corpus in every instance. The Ranford case inrolreri 
direct appeal in an attempt to obtain collateral relief. 
Habeas corpus is not a substitute for appeal. In Thomp. 
son v. Harris, 107 Utah 99, 152 P.2d 91 ( 1944), ti,h 
court indicated that habeas corpus is much narrower 
in scope than direct appeal and is limited to those j11. 
stances where there has been a substantial departure 
from due process. This court stated: 
" ... The writ of habeas corpus must not he 
used to discover and correct all errors ,1·hicl1 
might creep into a criminal trial. The time for 
taking an appeal has wisely been limited by law. 
If the writ of habeas corpus were to be used to 
reach all defects in the trial which could be 
raised by a timely appeal, no conviction could 
ever become final. \Ve recognize that some errors 
are more prejudicial to a defendant than are 
others, but if habeas corpus is to be used to cor· 
rect error, where can we draw the line? Shaula 
we leave the determination as to when there Im 
been and has not been sufficient error to war· 
rant interference by the use of a writ of h.abeas 
corpus entirely to the discretion of. each .iudge 
based on standards which he mar mvoke from 
his own mind? \Ve believe that the only sound 
line that can be drawn is to restrict the ~1se 01 
the writ of habeas corpus to the correction of 
jurisdictional errors and to errors so gross a) 
14 
t · 1 effect depri\·e the defendant of his consti-t~t:~nal substantive or procedural rights. Any-
thing short of that must be corrected on appeal 
r by the Board of Pardons. And this of course 
?. true ·whether the constitutional right is granted 
;;Y the State Constitution o~ by. the F"e~eral 
Constitution through absorpt10n m the Four-
teenth Amendment." 
Recentlv in Gulleyu~ 'l'. Turner, 17 U.2d 273, 400 
P.2d 386 ( 1963). this court again acknowledged the 
application of the principle in the Thompson case. This 
court stated with reference to the validity of judgments: 
" ... It is then not subject to attack under 
habeas corpus or any other collateral proceeding 
except in the most unusual circumstances: where 
the court was without jurisdiction; or there has 
been a substantial failure to accord the accused 
due process of law; or perhaps for example 
where it is indisputably shown that there is mis-
taken identity; or that there has been a knowing 
and wilful falsification of the evidence by the 
prosecutor; or some other such circumstance that 
it would be whollv unconscionable not to re-ex-
amine the conviction." 
Consequently, it is submitted that there is no basis for 
habeas corpus because of a technical failure to inten-
sil'ely advise a defendant pleading guilty as to all the 
consequences of his plea unless it is apparent that there 
was substantial likelihood, from what actually occurred, 
that the defendant would not have understood the con-
sequence of his plea or his rights would have been 
otherwise inadequately protected. In the instant case 
facts clearly demonstrate that the appellant was advised 
15 
of the consequences of his plea and did there ft . 
a er w1tl1 
full knowledge voluntarily enter a plea of guilty. 
The appellant also assails the failure of ti 
. . ie court 
to fully advise the defendant of the elements of 
ff Th
. . the 
o ense. . is issue does not .app~ar in the pleadings 
of the parties and apparently is raised for the fir t t' s lllll 
on appeal. Further, the record does not indicate that 
there was any confusion in the mind of the appellant 
as to his guilt. The appellant contends that the district 
attorney's use of the word "asportation" in advisinr1 
0 
the court as to why the charge was grand larceny indi-
cates that the appellant actually has a defense to the 
crime to which he plead guilty. It is submitted that 
this does not follow. Two elements are essential for botJ1 
larceny and wrongful appropriation of an automobile. 
Asportation is a common element to both and if the 
intent is not one to steal, the offense of wrongful appro· 
priation of an automobile may be appropriate. How-
ever, if the intent is otherwise, asportation no matter 
how slight would be sufficient to provide for a convic-
tion of grand larceny. Consequently, the district attar· 
ney was merely advising the court that simply because 
there may only have been a momentary asportation of 
a vehicle, the appellant could still be guilty, assuming 
the appropriate intent. Further it is worth noting that 
nowhere in the record now before the court did the 
appellant offer evidence of any confusion as to whether 
he was in fact pleading to a proper charge. 
Appellant calls the court's attention to some cases 
he contends support the proposition for reversal. The 
16 
f, Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1947), case o . . 
. h 11 inapplicable to the facts m this case. Even 
!SW 0 Y · . 
· that case the court did not reverse outright but 
W, ITT • 
1, sent the matter back for further hearmg on the rnere \ 
tacts.· The evidence showed the failure of the court to 
a oint counsel even though there had been a request f~; counsel. It showed a failure to comply with the 
most fundamental concepts of due process of law. A 
simple reading of the case shows that it bears no rela-
tionship to the matter now before the court. Even so, 
ou rehearing, the lower federal courts sustained the 
judgment entered on a plea of guilty. Ex parte Von 
Moltke v. Gillies, 72 F.Supp. 994 (D.C. E.D. Mich.); 
Von Moltke v. United States, 189 F.2d 56 (6th Cir. 
1951). It is interesting that in the latter case the court 
observed: 
"It is well settled that in a collateral attack 
on a judgment in a proceeding of this nature 
the burden of proof rests upon the petitioner fo 
establish by a preponderance of evidence that 
she did not competently and intelligently waive 
her constitutional right to assistance of counsel. 
(Cases cited.) The case \Vas remanded to the 
J?istrict Court for a specific finding of fact, con-
sidered by the Supreme Court to be decisive 
of the ruling in this case. This involved a clear 
question of credibilitv of witnesses for the trial 
judge. The credibilit:v of the witnesses is for 
the trier of the facts. Hawk v. Olson, supra, 326 
U.S. at page 279. 66 S. Ct. at page 120. Rule 
52, Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. 
\~ e ~re of the opinon that the findings of the 
D1str1ct Judge on the factual issues disposed 
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of by him are amply supported b r th . 
hereinabove referred to and th; e evidence 
. l d , v are aeco i mg y approve and accepted." · ru· 
The instant case presented issues which , 
. \\ere pr1. 
marily for the determination of the trial court. ' 
The record amply supports the trial cou t'. fu r s 11J. 
ings. The other cases cited by the appellant a . re 111. 
relevant to the appellant's position in this case. . 
POINT Ill 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAI 
THE APPELLANT 'V AIVED THE SER\" 
ICES OF COUNSEL AT THE TIME HE EX-
TERED HIS PLEA OF GUILTY IS AMPLY 
SUBSTANTIATED BY THE RECORD. 
The record in the instant case clearly shows a full 
and intelligent waiver of counsel by the appellant. 111 
State v. Spiers, 12 U.2d 14, 361 P.2d 509 (1961), the 
defendant, a nineteen year old boy, plead guilty to 
the crime of second degree burglary. On appeal from 
the denial of habeas corpus, this court said: 
"The determining factor of whether appellan! 
was convicted without due process of !aw 1s, 
whether there has been an intelligent waiver ol 
his right to counsel. This must depend. upon 
the facts and circumstances of each case, mclud~ 
ing the background, experience and conduct 01 
the accused. 
"It is argued that the evidence shows t~iat 
Spiers was only 19 years old, that he was im· 
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mature for his age, that his I.Q. was only 75, 
that he graduated f~om high school _with low 
grades and was obnousl~· somewhat immature 
for his age. The burden is upon the defendant 
to show that he has been denied his constitutional 
rights. The tr~al court, after . hear~ng t~e wit-
nesses and seemg appellant give his testimony, 
was in much better position than we to judge 
his intelligence. There was no evidence of fear 
or coercion, or any other reason why he was 
induced to waive his rights other than that he 
thourrht the course he took was for his best good. Ther~ was nothing to indicate that at any stage 
pf the proceedings he did not understand what 
was going on, the questions asked, or the effect 
of his waiver of counsel. In view of this situation 
we conclude that the trial court's finding that 
he intelligently waived his right to counsel must 
be sustained." 
The facts in this case show that the appellant was 
advised of his right to counsel on three different occa-
sions at the time of his arraignment before entering 
his plea of guilty. By his own admission in answer to 
the interrogatories, he had been advised of his right 
to counsel at the time of the preliminary hearing. It 
is obvious that the trial court could properly conclude 
from the repeated advice given the appellant that he 
definitely did not want counsel. In Strite v. Boles, 140 
S.E.2d 611 ("\V. Va. 1965), the 'Vest Virginia Supreme 
Court, in a comparable case, found an intelligent waiver 
of counsel by the defendant. The court stated: 
. "In ~he circumstances of this case the peti-
tioner is not entitled to the relief prayed for. 
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The right to the assistance of co 1 f d 1 . unse wli'] un amenta right protected by the 'r .1.e u 
of .the Fourteenth Amendment to th~ 0~ 1sio11i 
tut10nal of the United States may b ~onit:. 
d 'f h · · ' e waived f,. accuse 1 sue waiver is made intell' ti ! 
understandingly. State ex rel. Ma ige: 1 anrl 
·vv arden, \V. Va., 139 S.E.2d i 59. Y · 0111· 
"The order of the trial court referred t b · ·1 ' o a ore is not s1 ent on the matter of counsel fo th 
d . r eut cuse . \V1th clarity it reveals that th ft 1 . . e court a e~ exp ammg the nature of the charge and tiir 
Pt.oss1ble fcoh:r:iseq.uehnces thereof, advised the pet~ 
10ner o is rig t to the assistance of coun I 
and offered such assistance. \Vith equal clar:t1 
the order show.s that ~rith f~ll understanding 
of . the ~ro~eedmg agamst him, the petitioner 
waived his right to counsel. It is obvious that ;hi, 
petitioner had full knowledge of the conse· 
quences of his plea. \Vith complete understand· 
ing he admitted his guilt and relied upon h~ 
request for probation." 
The appellant argues that the court should have 
advised him that he could have counsel even though he. 
could not afford counsel. It is submitted that the con· 
text of this record makes it obvious that appellant did 
not desire counsel of any kind; and that although H 
might have been a better practice to have giYen sucli 
advice, the failure in this instance did not preclude an 
intelligent waiver of counsel. Further, there is nothing 
in the record that in any way indicates the appellant 
was in fact indigent and could not have afforded coun· 
sel. In the Application of John-son, 47 Cal. Rep. 17 
(Calif. 1965), a similar issue was before the court. In 
rejecting the position of the appellant, the court stated: 
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" ... Despite the trial court's dereliction of 
duty in this regar<l, however, i~ ~oes ~ot .appear 
that any infringement of petitioners right to 
counsel resulted therefrom. N ~ contenti~n. is 
here made, it was not alleged m the petition, 
and there was no showing in this proceeding or 
in the lower court that petitioner was an indigent 
or financially unable to employ counsel. In fact, 
the shmving or inference from the record strongly 
suggests that petitioner was :financially able to 
do so. 
"We recognize that petitioner was not re-
quired to make any claim or showing in the trial 
court of finanical inability to employ counsel in 
order to here complain of the court's failure to 
advise him of the right to court appointed coun-
sel. But it must be borne in mind that if he is 
entitled to redress it is because he was deprived 
of the right to such counsel and not simply be-
cause he was inadequately advised. The right 
to court appointed counsel is a conditional one; 
it exists only if the accused is financially unable 
to employ counsel. Accordingly, in this proceed-
ing if petitioner asserts his constitutional right 
to court appointed counsel was infringed, it is 
incumbent upon him to allege or show that he 
was without ability to employ counsel since it 
must be made to appear that the right exists 
before there can be any claim of deprivation." 
Other cases that support a finding of a valid waiver 
of the constitutional right to counsel in this case are 
Placorolle 'V. Maryland, 239 Md. 416, 2ll A.2d 828 
(1965); Amsler v. H~kins, 2 Ohio St. 2d 229, 208 N.E. 
2d 137 (1965); People v. De Blumer, 16 N.Y.2d 20 
(1965). 
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It is obvious from the record in the int 
8 ant ca1 
that the trial court acted within the bound" f ti 1 
d . fi d. h ~ o le en ence m n mg t at the appellant had been 
. . . properJr. 
advised of h1s rights to counsel and had intelligent!, 
waived the same. ' 
CONCLUSION 
The record in the instant case clearly supports t;,, 
findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the tri:i' 
court. These findings of fact and conclusions ,lf law 1rn, 
not erroneous when examined against the state of ii1r 
record in the instant case. The appellant was given em: 
opportunity at the time he entered his plea of guilti; :,. 
obtain the assistance of counsel and to protest his i1~ 
nocence if he saw fit. He voluntarily entered a pleaii 
guilty and even thereafter, before sentencing, 1m 
afforded the opportunity to have counsel and rejecttd 
it. Under these circumstances, there is no basis for relie1 
by habeas corpus. 
This court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondellt 
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